

Stopping to Smell the Roses

Rousseau and Mortality in the Modern World

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Abstract: The fear of death is a major preoccupation in the West. This is not surprising given the debt we owe to Hobbes, who encourages this fear and makes it a central feature of his account of human nature. Rousseau, in contrast, wishes to reduce this fear as much as possible. Amour propre and the humanity Rousseau encourages are incompatible with excessive concern for self-preservation. This accounts for his antipathy for doctors and the medical arts. Rousseau, through his presentation of Emile [AQ1: **Should it be “Emile” or “Émile”?** I’ve changed all the references to the former, but we should be consistent in the way you think is correct. In your original manuscript you accented the italicized title of the work, but when you discussed the character you used an unaccented E. Please let me know what you’d like and I will make the necessary changes] and the savage, initially claims that the fear of death is unnatural and that humans should take a stoic stance toward it and all human attachments that lead to our “feeling death twice.” A closer reading reveals that humans always have an awareness of death and that modern humans cannot entirely avoid these attachments. We can, however, avoid making preservation our highest goal, and this is essential to our happiness and ability to have compassion for others.

Keywords: amour propre, death, *Emile*, fear, Hobbes, Rousseau

I (AQ2: PLEASE PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE SUBHEADING INSTEAD OF NUMERALS)

[Need bio]

Rousseau took the adage “Stop and smell the roses” literally. In his latter years he began to practice botany as a diversion from his persecutions and as a pleasant pastime. He did not hope to make any progress in this endeavor, nor did he expect to learn anything useful. This was in marked contrast to Rousseau’s belief that most people have the habit “of seeking in plants only drugs and remedies.”¹ Rather than seeing a flower as a flower, we see medicine and its connection with ourselves and our ailments.

This tendency to see nature only in terms of how it can prolong our lives had existed since ancient times, but was becoming more pronounced in Rousseau’s time. The Enlightenment’s focus on the ability of natural science to better human lives led to a series of dramatic medical discoveries that has continued to our time. In the midst of these discoveries, however, Rousseau stood out as one who despised medicine and doctors and favored letting nature take its course. Rousseau mentions doctors as the first group among his enemies—after his individual persecutors.² He claims he abandoned his doctors’ recommended regimen after fifteen years and regained his original health. This made him “living proof of the vanity of their art and of the uselessness of their care.”³

This preoccupation with medicine and doctors might seem at first to be the idiosyncrasy of a brilliant but strange man. This concern is at the heart of Rousseau’s critique of modern philosophy. From his perspective, the modern emphasis on medical science is only the symptom of a deeper problem.

For early modern philosophers, and Hobbes in particular, self-preservation is the highest goal and requires an exaggeration of the human fear of death. Increasing this natural fear is an essential part of Hobbes’s effort to curb the dangers of excessive pride. In making the fear of death, or, in

Locke's rephrasing, the prolongation of life, the foundation of civil society, these philosophers had created great obstacles to human happiness, the capacity to have compassion for others, and the ability to be virtuous. Medical science was one of the main instruments to pursue these goals, and its propensity to emphasize human weakness, encourage egoism, and play on the worst aspects of the imagination were among the underlying causes of Rousseau's ire.

In contrast to Hobbes's view, Rousseau claims that humans in a natural state are not only not afraid of death but also not even aware of it. This presentation, however, is an exaggeration; human beings are always aware of their own mortality. We can at best lessen our fear and cease viewing death as the unmitigated evil it is for Hobbes. Whereas Hobbes sought to counter pride through exaggerating the fear of death, Rousseau sees this fear as inextricably linked to amour propre. Increasing the fear of death may limit some of the dangers of pride for Hobbes, but for Rousseau this aggravates the worst aspects of amour propre.

Civil peace could only be had, according to Hobbes, if those who are possessed by an excessive desire for glory are made to see that violent death is the worst thing a person can suffer and that this impulse is therefore a type of madness. This action only exacerbates the problem of amour propre for Rousseau. Although Hobbes's suppression of pride may prevent civil discord, it also encourages a person to see his or her own preservation as a priority in competitive terms, and as an essential component of self-worth, thereby excluding compassion for others and attaining true happiness.

Focusing on this strand of Rousseau's thought is essential because of early modern philosophy's success in encouraging this all-encompassing concern with our own preservation and the related sense of restlessness that, Hobbes claims, will cease only in death. Given that this theme stretches from Rousseau's early to late works, and given its clear significance for the contemporary West, there has been surprisingly little said in the scholarship on Rousseau about this topic.⁴

I begin with a discussion of Hobbes, who was the main architect of our current perspective on death, and then turn to Rousseau, for whom death should, to the farthest extent possible, be regarded as a necessity rather than something to be feared. To avoid "feeling death twice" humans should avoid having great attachment to others. Although Rousseau initially claims that the savage person and Emile will not fear death, they both turn out to be exaggerated characters. For Rousseau, human beings can never entirely avoid having a certain amount of attachment to others or the suffering that this inevitably causes, nor can human beings avoid at least some degree of awareness of, and uneasiness about, death. We can, however, moderate this fear and avoid making preservation the highest goal. This is essential to our happiness and ability to have compassion for others.

II (AQ3: SUBHEADING NEEDED)

Hobbes says that fear is the passion to be reckoned on when forming civil society.⁵ The most famous passage in all

of Hobbes's works is the description of the state of nature in chapter 13 of *Leviathan*, in which he says life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."⁶ The fear of a short life that ends badly should be the glue that holds society together. Hobbes is the first philosopher to found civil society on fear, and this innovation was made possible through his systematic and, he claims, scientific analysis of human nature.

What Hobbes offers, though, is not a complete account of his own view of human nature, but it emphasizes the role of fear for a particular purpose. Hobbes's views on the fear of violent death are at least as prescriptive as they are descriptive. When Hobbes talks about the role of the fear of violent death in human affairs, he is describing something that is undeniably true—human beings no doubt fear death—but he is also exaggerating its importance. He is encouraging people to believe their lives should be their highest concern.⁷

Hobbes's goal is the establishment of a peaceful civil society, and this entails limiting or eliminating the causes of civil strife. For Hobbes, the greatest sources of conflict are pride, private judgments about good and evil, and hope for an afterlife. These are sources of conflict precisely because they outweigh the fear of death.⁸ He had to find a way to undermine these and replace them with something else. He determined that if people could be made to care more for their lives here on Earth than for their reputation or the afterlife, they would be less inclined to become involved in conflict. Hobbes, then, sets out to promote the ideal of the peaceful, law-abiding citizen who would regard excessive pride as madness and excessive piety as benighted superstition. Hobbes accomplishes this task by emphasizing the human natural fear of death: "Fear of Death," he claims, "disposeth men to obey a common Power."⁹

Hobbes was clearly aware that the fear of death could be overcome by love of glory or hope in divine providence—phenomena he saw operating on a large scale during the English Civil War. He says as much in *On the Citizen* when he claims "[a]ny sign of hatred and contempt is more provocative of quarrels and fighting than anything else, so that most men prefer to lose their peace *and even their lives* rather than suffer insult."¹⁰ Duels are a particular example of this phenomenon, and Hobbes believes the rashness of those who engage in them will not be overcome "till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge."¹¹

Hobbes also learned a great deal about human nature from Thucydides, whom he praises for making his readers spectators: "So that look how much a man of understanding might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings. . . . He may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself." [AQ4: Page number needed] Two of Thucydides' best-known passages demonstrate that the fear of death does not trump love of glory or religious hopes. From the Melian dialogue, we learn that human beings are often quite willing to give up their lives in the hope of supernatural aid. From Pericles we learn how great the lure of immortal glory is, and how much we have to gain by being "forward to encounter the dangers of war," because the whole world is the tomb of famous men.¹²

Hobbes combats the dangers of seeking this kind of glory by promoting the idea that those who are overly ambitious in seeking it are insane.

Hobbes views madness as one of the defects of intellectual virtue and defines it as “to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.”¹³ Pride is a chief cause of madness, and leads to rage and fury.¹⁴ That Hobbes wants his readers to view excessive pride and the desire for glory as types of insanity is implicit from much of what he says on the subject. No sane person would kill another for a smile.¹⁵

This madness is to some extent present in all of us, even when it is not apparent or not strong enough to cause rage. When men walk alone, Hobbes claims, they “would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publicly seen: which is a confession that Passions unguided, are for the most part mere Madnesse.”¹⁶

Thinking that each individual is living in a private world of delusion and extravagant opinion about himself or herself inclines us to remain isolated from others and always be somewhat fearful of our fellows. We are put on guard against acting in any way that might make us appear mad, and we are always somewhat distrustful of those around us because we can never know for certain what is going on in their minds. This way of thinking replaces our tendency toward pride with a fear of other human beings, and this acts as a constant check on our behavior. In this way Hobbes establishes a new standard of normalcy from which we fear to deviate.

Once pride has been checked, Hobbes still has to contend with those whose religious convictions might lead them to challenge the sovereign. In short, Hobbes attempts to overcome this difficulty by claiming the sovereign should be the head of the state’s church. The unification of the sovereign with the church is an attempt to focus fear on the sovereign and to eliminate religion as a competitor for that fear. This focuses our attention on the world at the expense of the afterlife. Because there is, according to Hobbes, no heaven—everything is body and natural reason would seem to be a sufficient guide to our actions—the pleasures and pains of this life take on a much greater importance.¹⁷ The implicit assumption of Hobbes’s depiction of civil society is that staying alive is the top priority.¹⁸ Life’s goal is fending off death and suffering, and our main fear is no longer a final judgment after death but death itself. Michael Gillespie argues this was an intentional move by Hobbes in response to the ever more frightening and compelling debates about the fate of the soul that grew during the Middle Ages and were exacerbated by the Reformation.¹⁹ In a similar vein, Charles Taylor argues Christianity increased our fear of death precisely because of judgment; before Christianity “we [had] no great reason to fear death.”²⁰ This may be an overstatement, but raises the possibility that Hobbes was harnessing and redirecting a new type of fear engendered by Christianity. The anxiety about the fate of one’s soul that could not be entirely satisfied until judgment day becomes what Hobbes sets down as “a generall inclination of all

mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death.”²¹ Whereas this pursuit could not be eliminated, it could be made more peaceful.

Locke did not reject the idea that the fear of death should be civil society’s foundation, but he recast it as the positive goal of preserving life.²² Rather than focusing on the unpleasant things that might happen in the state of nature, Locke emphasizes the good things a peaceful and industrious citizen could acquire in civil society. Government is instituted for the preservation of property, including one’s life and the means of sustaining it.²³ The desire to accumulate without limit, which is clearly akin to Hobbes’s unceasing quest for power after power, is linked to our desire for preeminence and status in the eyes of others. The power people perpetually seek involves having friends, riches, reputation, and generally being beloved—or feared—by others. The worth, or “true Value” of a person, says Hobbes, “is no more than it is esteemed by others.”²⁴ There is a clear connection between the constant desire for power and worth that drives human beings their and amour propre.²⁵

This desire for preeminence, Oakeshott points out, is closely connected to the fear of death: “Fear, here, is not merely being anxious lest the next pleasure escape him, but dread of falling behind in the race and thus being denied felicity. And every such dread is a reflection of the ultimate fear, the fear of death.”²⁶ Our desire to stay alive as long as possible must be seen in terms of competition with others. Because death is seen increasingly as a humiliating defeat, staying alive becomes essential to our self-esteem and, therefore, to our amour propre.

Although the accumulation of wealth and a high degree of comfort may mask the fear of death, this fear is never entirely hidden. The idea of preserving one’s life reminds us that our lives must end. We cannot preserve our lives indefinitely, nor can we, on the basis of this ethic, ever be satisfied with what we have. The alliance between this attitude, natural science, and an economy based on constant growth provides the perfect conditions for avoiding suffering, prolonging life, and accumulating property in a forgetful flight from the reality of mortality. We continue to pursue a receding goal, and are more or less in denial that this is the case.²⁷

III (AQ5: SUBHEADING NEEDED)

For Rousseau, it is impossible to live well or to be happy if people live in fear of death. People cannot become good or develop in any meaningful way until they cease viewing death as the greatest evil. Rousseau does not want to restore the fear of judgment after death that Hobbes undermines, but neither is he willing to accept that the fear of death should be the foundation of political society and a well-lived life. Rousseau does not hold, as Hobbes does, that the quest for power and esteem is a permanent feature of human nature or that staying alive at all costs is a legitimate human goal.

Rousseau acknowledges humans have an intense desire for self-preservation, and agrees with Hobbes and Locke that they have a right to do everything they need to do to

survive.²⁸ This aversion to pain and impulse toward self-preservation, however, has been transformed in society: “[W]e do not see that this love [of our own conservation], *the way we feel it*, is in large part the work of man.”²⁹ Humans’ entry into civil society and development of technology to ward off the dangers of the natural state cause an alteration in forethought. A person begins to imagine that his or her freedom extends far beyond natural power and begins to desire what he or she can never have.³⁰ This in turn leads to the belief that death is not an absolute necessity.³¹ So much time is spent living in, and planning for, the future that a person develops the hope that death can always put off a little longer.

Rousseau, for whom nature is always a standard, claims in several places that this anxiety in the face of death is not natural. Humans in the original state knew pain, but not death, and so were not afraid to die. The original human beings were not aware of the possibility they could die and “expired in the end, without anyone perceiving that they ceased to be, and almost without perceiving it themselves.”³² The savage dies without much complaint because he only strives for his preservation insofar as he has the means to attain it: “[W]hen these means escape him, he calms himself and dies without tormenting himself uselessly.”³³ Similarly, for Emile, “a savage made for living in cities,” after the first quarter of life “[w]ith regard to death, he does not know well what it is; but accustomed to suffer the law of necessity without resistance, when he must die he will die without lamenting and without struggling with himself.”³⁴ This initial presentation of the natural human approach to death is an exaggeration calculated to counter the preeminent status of self-preservation from Hobbes onward.

Melzer doubts the plausibility of Rousseau’s claim that natural humans did not fear death. The natural person could only accept death as a necessity if he or she knew what necessity was, and Melzer calls this into question.³⁵ Velkley, though, argues persuasively that the *Second Discourse* presents two accounts of the natural human response to death. In the main text we find the aforementioned description, in which the natural person knows nothing of death and therefore has no fear of it. The more attentive readers, those who want to read the work a second time, will find in the notes that even the most undeveloped and primitive humans have an awareness of death.³⁶ As Velkley notes, the pongos, or gorillas, that Rousseau identifies as potential human beings in the state of nature have a clear awareness that other creatures have will and an understanding of death: “Already the natural man has some imagination of the vast world and its boundless, often alarming possibilities. Far from being mere animal, he is the only being whose openness to Being exposes him to the nonbeing of death.”³⁷ The depiction of the natural person as one who is so unreflective as to have no conception of mortality, then, is not a model that can realistically be followed, but rather an exaggeration designed to lessen our fear and accept death as a necessity. Rousseau, like Hobbes—but for opposite reasons—offers a prescriptive rather than descriptive account of the fear of death.

Emile is another such idealized model. The fictitious Savoyard Vicar, who transformed the young Rousseau’s *amour propre* into compassion, agrees in almost every respect with what Rousseau says in the rest of *Emile* about the fear of death. He has the same disdain for doctors, the same focus on alleviating fear as a precondition to happiness, and, as we have seen, the same opinion about the connection between compassion and lack of concern with one’s mortality. On the topic of the naturalness of death, however, the Vicar’s statements differ from what the governor tells Emile. According to the Vicar, “Whatever the cause of our being, it had our preservation in mind in giving us feelings conducive to our nature; and we cannot deny that these at least are innate. These feelings, with respect to the individual, are *amour de soi*, fear of pain, horror of death, and the desire for well-being.”³⁸ For the Vicar, then, the fear of death—which Emile does not know—is natural. Both Rousseau and the Vicar claim that it is an obstacle to happiness. Rousseau may be using the voice of the Vicar, however, to give a more realistic account of just how great an obstacle it is.

What accounts in part for these different explanations is that Emile does not hear the Savoyard Vicar’s profession of faith, but rather it is an aside directed solely to the readers. What the Vicar says was meant for a young and troubled Rousseau, rather than an idealized and unrealizable Emile. Both the natural man of the *Second Discourse* and Emile possess an exaggerated impassivity in the face of death.

Being human, then, is inseparable from some awareness of mortality; as Rousseau says in *Emile*, “These diverse impressions [of death] have their modifications and their degrees, which depend on the particular character of each individual and his anterior habits; but they are universal, and no one is entirely exempt.”³⁹ Although we cannot avoid this awareness, we can begin to approximate a more natural approach to death and stop thinking of self-preservation as the highest and most natural priority.

Rousseau claims the necessity of death is mitigated somewhat by the thought that immortality is undesirable. It would be unbearable to suffer and potentially die if we thought we might live forever otherwise: “The necessity of dying is for the wise man only a reason for bearing the pains of life. If we were not sure of losing it one time, it would cost too much to preserve.”⁴⁰

This is partly why one goal of Emile’s education—an education meant to approximate the natural condition—is to make him see that all that happens is necessary and to limit his desire to what is attainable. This is why the governor uses force instead of reason with his pupil. The student needs to see that the rules he obeys come from necessity rather than human authority or caprice. In this way, he will not experience the battle of human wills that leads to thoughts of domination and servitude, and eventually to thoughts of being able to command necessity.

One who sees the will as the source of all constraint begins to feel that he or she deserves to be exempt from the necessary laws of nature, and that any resistance is an injustice committed against him personally:

Do you know the surest way to render your child miserable? It is making him accustomed to obtaining everything. . . . It is a natural disposition in man to regard as his everything which is in his power. In this sense the principle of Hobbes is true up to a certain point: multiplying with our desires the ways of obtaining them, everyone makes himself the master of everything. Thus, the child who has only to want [or will] to obtain believes himself the owner of the universe; he regards all men as his slaves: and when we are finally forced to refuse him something, he, believing everything to be possible when he commands, takes this refusal for an act of rebellion. . . .⁴¹

Our increasing ability to manipulate nature only increases this sense. This is why those who characterize the Enlightenment as a war against nature are justified in so doing. In only desiring what he or she can have, and being satisfied with this, a person feels strong, and only on this basis can he or she become happy. This is in clear opposition to Hobbes and Locke, who emphasize human deficiencies and weakness. The main necessity Hobbes and Locke urge us to struggle against is the one we can never overcome. Clearly seeing death as a necessity is one part of living in the right relationship to mortality; as Emile says after his two-year journey, “[D]eath is not a punishment for poverty, but a law of nature. Whenever death comes, I defy it, it will never surprise me making preparations for living; it will never prevent me from having lived.”⁴²

In this connection, Emile learns how to bear suffering. For Rousseau, suffering is only an obstacle to happiness for those who have not learned how to bear it. Regardless of the promise of modern science, human beings will inevitably suffer, just as they will certainly die. The more familiar Emile (who learns only gradually what death is) becomes with these ideas, the harder his soul will become.⁴³ It is on the basis of this hardness that Emile can become happy and not fear the approach of death.

In addition to making Emile feel that everything that happens to him is necessary, Rousseau also wants to prevent Emile from feeling most types of fear. Rousseau claims there is little that frightens the savage in the state of nature, and he attempts to approximate this in Emile by successively desensitizing him to spiders, loud noises, disturbing masks, and other sources of fear (such as the fear associated with religion).

What Rousseau says in *Emile* about religion in the state of nature seems at odds with what he says elsewhere. The seed of religion, which Rousseau recounts prior to the Vicar’s speech, was the human fear of the unknown in the state of nature. Whereas in the *Second Discourse* Rousseau held that man in this state was frightened of little and felt himself to be strong,⁴⁴ in *Emile* he claims that man in the same state was weak, “frightened of everything,” and saw gods everywhere and in everything.⁴⁵ It may be that the *Second Discourse* is describing a much earlier stage of development than *Emile*, but it is clear that Emile, who is educated to feel strong and not afraid, will be natural in the former sense but not in the latter. Rousseau wants Emile to be natural except insofar as animism is natural. Rousseau expects that by using his own reason Emile will develop an understanding of religion akin to the natural religion of

the Savoyard Vicar. Unlike all the other effects of history on humankind, the historical progression of thought from polytheism to natural religion is implicitly accepted as positive. This is because the earlier type of religion was based on fear, whereas the latter helps to eliminate fear, and gives us a sense that we are part of an ordered whole.

This is an essential element of being happy; just as we feel weak when our desire exceeds our capacity, so we feel weak when we are afraid of unknown objects.⁴⁶ The fear of death is especially pernicious in this regard, and it is because of doctors’ role in promoting it that Rousseau will not allow Emile to have any contact with them unless he is in immediate mortal danger.⁴⁷

Rousseau’s animus against doctors and medicine is motivated by the fact that these play on the worst aspects of forethought and imagination. According to Rousseau, doctors do not assuage our fear but create it. Even if they cure the body, in killing courage, promoting credulity, cowardice, and terror of death they cause more problems than they solve: “What does it matter to us that they make cadavers walk? It is men that we need, and we do not see any leaving their hands.”⁴⁸ Unlike the savage, who only feels death once, those people under a doctor’s care—and those who are overly preoccupied with health and medicine—feel their death constantly; rather than being alive or dead, they feel themselves to be perpetually dying.⁴⁹ The Savoyard Vicar, who agrees with Rousseau in almost everything on this topic, says that “foresight of death renders it horrible, and accelerates it; the more one wants to flee it, the more one feels it; and he dies of fright throughout his life, while murmuring against nature for the ills that he made for himself in offending it.”⁵⁰ Rousseau urges us to “[s]uffer, die or get better; but above all live until your last hour.”⁵¹ The development of forethought has made it impossible to return to the original ignorance of death. Rousseau, however, does not intend for people to dwell on death constantly any more than he wants them to deny its reality.

Rousseau regards the fear of death as incompatible with happiness. This happiness is closely related to what Rousseau understands by the term “living.” He writes, “I do not know how to teach living to one who dreams only of preventing himself from dying.”⁵² This is why he does not condemn all doctors. After criticizing them for instilling fear in their patients, he praises a pair of doctors for their important work on the effects of nutrition on the milk of breastfeeding women—a topic Rousseau deals with at length and clearly believes is important to the child’s health.⁵³ The difference is that these doctors were focused on promoting life rather than avoiding death, and it was this “moral side” of medicine that concerned Rousseau more than its practical usefulness.⁵⁴ For example, although Emile will not be inoculated, Rousseau hesitates to recommend that parents not inoculate their children.

What Rousseau means precisely by living well is controversial. A phrase that might best define what he means by a well-lived life is a “feeling of existence.”⁵⁵ Living, unlike the state of dying, is not understood in quantitative temporal terms: “Living, it is not breathing, it is acting; it is making use of our organs, of our senses, of our faculties, of all the

parts of ourselves, that give us the feeling [or sentiment] of existence. The man who has lived most is not he who has counted the most years, but he who has most felt life."⁵⁶ This does not mean a life filled with intense passion—which Emile is not supposed to feel—or intense activity but is ideally a lasting state “that has nothing lively in itself, but the duration of which increases the charm to the point of finding in it the end supreme felicity.”⁵⁷ As already noted, part of being happy is feeling oneself to be strong, and this is from the effect this feeling has on our souls: “In the state of weakness and insufficiency, the care of conserving ourselves concentrates us within ourselves; in the state of strength and force, the desire to extend our being carries us beyond [ourselves].”⁵⁸ It is clear from this passage that this feeling is only possible for those who are not preoccupied with self-preservation. **[AQ6: In this paragraph there is a repetition of the word “feeling” that makes it somewhat confusing whether you mean the “feeling of existence” or “feeling oneself to be strong.” Please reword slightly for clarity]**

Rousseau describes two incidents in *Rêveries* in which he had this experience. The first comes after he had fallen face-first onto one of the cobblestone streets of Paris. Despite losing four teeth, suffering many cuts, and bleeding a great deal, Rousseau writes that his sensations on regaining consciousness were of the approaching night, the sky, some stars, and greenery: “This first sensation was a delicious moment. I did not feel myself except through this. I was being born at this instant to life, and it seemed to me that I filled with my light existence all the objects that I perceived. . . . I did not remember anything; I had no distinct notion of my own individuality. . . . I felt neither pain, nor fear, nor worry.”⁵⁹ Rousseau claims he found nothing comparable to this experience in all the pleasures of his life. When he was, so to speak, knocked senseless the lack of reflection opened the door to a feeling of unity and connection with everything around him, and it was this that made him feel fully alive.

The other, better-known description of this feeling came when Rousseau was living on Lake Saint Pierre in Switzerland and would often stretch out in a boat and allow himself to drift. **[AQ7: Please double-check; the biography I found said he living on the island of Saint-Pierre in the Lake of Biel]** In this situation, he says, one feels “[n]othing outside oneself, nothing except oneself and one’s own existence, as long as that state lasts, we are sufficient to ourselves like God. The feeling of existence, stripped of all other affection is by itself a precious feeling of contentment and peace.”⁶⁰ In this state “the soul finds a seat solid enough to settle itself entirely and to gather there all its being.”⁶¹ Although Rousseau claims it is a sign of weakness to concentrate ourselves within ourselves, it is clear that this state—the result of being overly concerned with self-preservation—must be distinguished from the feeling of existence, which involves a simultaneous, reflective concentration of the soul within, and expansion beyond, ourselves. The key difference is that in a state of weakness we see the source of our happiness outside ourselves and in a state of strength we see the source of happiness within. This

latter state allows us to experience everything outside us as it is rather than as it relates to us. For example, it allows us to see plants as plants rather than as medicine, and, as we will see, something akin to this state is the first step to feeling compassion for others.

Although this state may be similar to what the natural human experienced, Rousseau does set it up as an ideal for which to strive. It is unsustainable in modern humans and Rousseau never claims Emile has precisely this type of experience; his happiness depends on the practice of a stoic virtue that requires cultivation rather than a natural unreflective state. Both of the incidents Rousseau describes were short-lived and left him with feelings of melancholy and nostalgia (and a great deal of pain in the first example). Because of the inevitable reflection that characterizes post-natural humans, it would seem to be impossible for them to experience this state over a long period of time.⁶² Even if we accept the necessity of death to the greatest extent and are not living in fear of it, living fully in Rousseau’s sense does not come automatically. *Rêveries* as a whole is written in the melancholy tone of one contemplating the end of his or her life, and nearly every chapter (or “walk”) contains some reflections on death and what it means to live in light of death. Rousseau regrets that it is only as an old man that he has begun to learn what it means to live, and observes that most people spend their lives acquiring what they cannot take to their graves. “I was made for living,” he says, “and I die without having lived.”⁶³ It is in light of this that he begins to take his solitary walks, because “[t]hese hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones of the day during which I am fully myself and for myself without diversion, without obstacle, and during which I can truly be said to be what nature wanted.”⁶⁴

This solitary activity as the locus of his greatest happiness would seem to be an example of what Melzer calls “a radical new kind of individualism, not merely political but, as it were, ontological. Each man, containing the source of his happiness and of his being within himself, has no essential connection to anything outside him, whether social or metaphysical.”⁶⁵ Rousseau, despite his opposition to much of what Hobbes says, accepts and builds on his assumption that humans are not naturally social animals: “A truly happy being is a solitary being.”⁶⁶ Indeed, this lack of connection to others goes so far that Emile has no more regard for his sister than for his watch.⁶⁷ This is evidence of a strong, stoic influence on Rousseau. Epictetus expresses the same sentiment in his *Handbook*:

In the case of everything attractive or useful or that you are fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, beginning with the least little thing. If you are fond of a jug, say “I am fond of a jug!” For then when it is broken you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or wife, say you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset.⁶⁸

But how serious is Rousseau about the naturalness of this stoic attitude? How does this position fit with Rousseau’s praise of the Golden Age as the happiest age, and his assertion that “the habit of living together bore the sweetest sentiments known to man, familial love, and paternal love?”⁶⁹ Emile, like the natural man of the *Second Discourse*, is an

exaggerated ideal. His pure and healthy heart, Rousseau admits at one point, may be too difficult for ordinary people to follow.⁷⁰ The implication is that we cannot completely divorce ourselves from these types of human attachments.

In *Emile*'s case this includes his attachment to Sophie and his governor. When *Emile* begins to feel too strong an attachment to Sophie, the governor does what he can to break him of this bond because it has put him in the position of "dying twice."⁷¹ Because as difficult as it is to accept our own mortality, reconciling ourselves to the death of our loved ones is likely an even greater challenge. Reiser discusses the strong bond between *Emile* and his tutor,⁷² which is a type of friendship. *Emile*—although raised to be self-sufficient—says at the end of the book that he needs his tutor to stay with him forever as a guide. Rousseau also ends *Emile* before any children are born, thereby averting the need to explain how *Emile* will overcome what is potentially the strongest human bond. *Emile*'s travels lessen his attachment to Sophie and all the transitory things of human life—precisely those things "civilized" people need to find meaning in life: homeland and family. As Deneen points out, "Thus is *Emile*'s political education essentially a lesson in mortality."⁷³

In *Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires*, the unfinished sequel to *Emile*, we see more clearly that even the perfect upbringing the child receives is not enough to cure him of these human attachments. In this work, which consists of two letters from *Emile* to the governor, *Emile* relates the miseries he experienced after his teacher's departure: he lost his wife, his children, his friends, and everything he had. "My heart," he says, "was torn by all these attachments."⁷⁴ He claims he is dead in everything that was dear to him. [AQ8: Do you mean "He claims that everything that was dear to him is dead," or do you have another meaning? Please reword for clarity] The governor, is dead to *Emile*, although he says his heart is constantly preoccupied with him. Although he remembers the governor's teachings on bearing necessary suffering and has not been crushed by despair, he wonders, "But what sensible being can live always without passions, without attachments?"⁷⁵ To be free of these, he speculates, one must be either a beast or a god—but not a human being. *Emile* places the blame for his unhappy condition, his loss of Sophie, and even the death of his child on his departed teacher: "No, never under your eyes the crime and its pains would have approached my family; in abandoning it you've done me more evil than you had done me good in all my life."⁷⁶ When *Emile* learns that Sophie has committed adultery and is pregnant with another man's child, he is inconsolable and for a time contemplates exacting cruel vengeance on her. He says he would rather "see [his] son dead than to see Sophie with one from another father."⁷⁷ This is a far cry from the equanimity and lack of personal connection that was the aim of his education. *Emile* has not conquered his amour propre and regains something of his composure only after fleeing Paris and setting off on a solitary journey.⁷⁸ *Emile*, who takes on some of the melancholy and philosophic reflection of the solitary walker, does not break his attachment to Sophie and so experiences death twice.

Emile is an unrealistic extreme, even though he is supposed to have a high degree of equanimity. He is a natural man living in a corrupt society. In the perfect society that Rousseau describes in the *Social Contract*, man is to find his fulfillment in his close connection with others, and is expected to be willing to die for the sake of the community.⁷⁹ He will not fear death or be grieved at the death of his fellow citizens because it is the life of the republic that is primary for him (recall the Spartan mother whose concern is Sparta's victory—not the death of her own sons). While the natural man is self-sufficient and lives only for himself, the citizen of the social contract is only complete when he or she is part of society. The *Social Contract* is the opposite extreme of *Emile* [AQ9: Do you mean *Emile* or *Emile et Sophie*? Please refer to similar AQs in the notes section and clarify]; the perfect citizen is furthest from the natural human and requires the most radical denaturing.

When Rousseau tell us in *Emile* [AQ10: See AQ9] that "Plato only purified the heart of man; Lycurgus denatured it," we might, at first glance, believe he was praising Plato and criticizing Lycurgus, [AQ11: Need citation for this quote] but it was Plato who, in purifying the human heart, was in part responsible for freeing the passions that led ultimately to the Enlightenment. By denaturing humans Lycurgus created a political regime that was wholly conventional: "Good social institutions are those which know best how to denature man, taking from him his absolute existence in order to give him a relative one, and transporting the *I* into the common unity." [AQ12: Need citation] Since Plato purified the human heart rather than denaturing it, he emphasized the distinction between nature and convention, allowing people to begin to live according to a standard other than that of the community.⁸⁰

The citizen, though, like the natural man, cannot spend his life preoccupied with death. A society composed of those who seek primarily to prolong their lives is necessarily fragmented; the fear of death cannot create the sort of social bond that unites the citizens of the *Social Contract*. Neither *Emile* nor the citizen of the *Social Contract* can be subject to corrupt amour propre or to preoccupation with the fear of death.

Although the perfectly natural person is supposed to have no strong personal connection to others, he or she nonetheless has sympathy for them, and at the very least cannot stand to see another living being suffer. This natural pity is incompatible with a high degree of reflection. This is why it is the "rabble, it is the market women, who separate those who fight, and prevent honest people from slaughtering each other," whereas it is the philosopher who covers his ears at the sound of one being strangled outside his window, and, after arguing a bit with himself, says, "Perish if you will, I am safe."⁸¹ This results from untamed amour propre. The development is inevitable in society, even for one who receives a perfect upbringing, but is entirely negative. Non-corrupt amour propre requires that we extend our being to others, which necessitates that we identify our own being with the suffering of others through the correct use of imagination.⁸² When Rousseau describes the desire to extend his being, this means both to the "whole of nature"

and to other individuals: “I cannot meanwhile concentrate myself entirely in myself, because my expansive soul seeks despite myself to extend its feelings and its existence to other beings.”⁸³ Ideally, our natural pity can be sublimated into this high level of humanity.⁸⁴

Rousseau, however, lived in a corrupt society in which vain people who found their happiness in his misery thwarted his desire to exercise this humanity. This is why he found it necessary to seek solitude despite his sociable and loving nature. He describes this as a sort of social death or being “buried alive,” thus indicating that, for a properly ordered modern person, human contact and society is necessary for a full life.⁸⁵ The type of solitary happiness he describes in *Rêveries* is only available to those in similar circumstances who have been cut off from humankind, can no longer do anything useful for themselves or for others, and must live with as little contact as possible with society. This is not an ideal situation, and it is good that most people are not driven to this extreme because they would then be unable to fulfill their duty to others.⁸⁶

Rousseau claims to have developed his understanding and sense of humanity under the tutelage of the Savoyard Vicar. The Vicar taught him, without challenging his pride directly, to make it less harmful to others. Rousseau writes that “he taught me to deplore the errors of my fellows, to feel pity for their miseries and to be sorry for them more than to envy them.”⁸⁷ After this, Rousseau says that those moments when he could gladden another heart from his own free will gave him a pleasure “sweeter than any other.”⁸⁸

This disposition, which is essential to happiness and to living fully, goes with the sort of approach to life—and consequently death—that has been described. As the Vicar says in the same context, “Peace of soul consists in contempt for everything that can trouble it: the man who thinks most highly of his life is he who knows least how to enjoy it and he who aspires to happiness most avidly is always the most miserable.”⁸⁹ Both our happiness and our capacity for compassion are inseparable from this quasi-stoic equanimity toward our lives. It is a necessary part of virtue for the citizen of the *Social Contract* and for Emile: “If you want to see men of real courage, look for them in places where there are no doctors, where they are ignorant of the consequences of illness, and where they never dream of death.”⁹⁰ One whose primary motivation is self-preservation cannot become virtuous. This approach to death, then, makes us good for ourselves and good for others.

Rousseau suggests three maxims that a preceptor can use to develop a pupil’s sense of goodness and humanity and to prevent a sense of amour propre from being corrupted: (1) we can only commiserate with those worse off than ourselves, (2) we can only have sympathy for those ills from which we can conceivably suffer ourselves, and (3) we must be able to recognize that others are conscious of their suffering. The pupil, then, must become aware of the miseries of others through sad stories and personal experience. Although Emile is desensitized to many types of fear, his governor cultivates Emile’s fear of suffering these miseries.⁹¹ This is in clear contradiction to Rousseau’s earlier statements that Emile could be brought up to fear little and

be invulnerable to suffering, and is further evidence that Emile represents an unattainable goal and an impossible combination of characteristics.

It is not only the poor whose suffering Emile observes; he also sees that the wealthy and successful suffer in their own way, and he realizes the successful student will be better off without all their advantages.⁹² It is through understanding that he does not suffer in the same way as other people that Emile will become both compassionate and happy. This might appear at first glance to be a type of *schadenfreude*, but this sort of pity involves the least possible personal interest and is free “of those sentiments that force us to compare ourselves to others” and affect our self-esteem.⁹³ Emile is not happy because others suffer, but because he does not. He finds happiness in his capacity to pity and share in the miseries of others while not experiencing them. Although Emile’s humanity is awakened by the expansion of his own being to other people and his identification with their suffering, his own happiness is something that must be closed in around his own heart.⁹⁴

Those for whom self-preservation is the highest priority suffer from the terror of death and are not in a position to develop the sentiments of pity and compassion Rousseau hopes to inspire in Emile: “When we have suffered, when we fear suffering, we pity those who suffer; but when we suffer, we pity only ourselves.”⁹⁵ Similarly, the invidious competition Hobbes claims characterizes all human life cannot be compatible with the humanity Rousseau believes to be essential to happiness.

IV (AQ13: SUBHEADING NEEDED)

Hobbes wants to suppress pride and overzealous piety by emphasizing the natural fear of death. Rousseau seeks to transform pride and religion to allow for human happiness, and realizes this is not possible for those who are preoccupied with the fear of death. Rousseau to a great extent builds on Hobbes’s foundation: he does not attempt to reduce the fear of death by attempting to transform society so that people could hope to be remembered forever for glorious deeds, nor does he attempt to emphasize the element of judgment.

Rousseau does not want us to become religious fanatics anymore than he wants to encourage radical philosophical skepticism (which the Savoyard Vicar claims is just as dogmatic and groundless as its opposite). This is clear from a long footnote near the end of the Vicar’s profession that must be Rousseau’s voice, unless we assume the Vicar had found a way to insert footnotes into his speech. In this note Rousseau urges us to steer a middle way between the philosophic spirit, which causes “attachment to life, effeminacy, debases souls, concentrates all the passions in the baseness of particular interest, in the abjectness of the human *I*, and quietly saps the real foundations of all society,” and religious fanaticism, which is incontestably worse because of the bloodshed it causes, but which “elevates the human heart and makes [man] despise death, and gives him a prodigious spring that only needs to be better directed in order to draw the most sublime virtues from it.”⁹⁶

Rousseau, like Hobbes, accepts the truth of modern natural science, and makes no attempt to return to ‘the tomes of the old moralists.’ [AQ14: **Is this a quote? If not I will eliminate quotes**] What he opposes is the restlessness that has persisted since Hobbes’s claim that life is characterized by a restless search for power and ends only in death.

The epigraph to *Emile* reads in part, “We are sick with evils that can be cured.” One element of this sickness is the fear of illness and death brought on by forethought and reflection. I have tried to show in this article that, according to Rousseau, the modern emphasis on self-preservation has aggravated amour propre, and no taming of amour propre can take place without a simultaneous change in our approach to our mortality. It is not possible to cultivate virtue or to redirect human beings toward what will truly make them happy without a simultaneous reduction of the fear of death. People can never be entirely comfortable with mortality. This is one of the distinguishing characteristics of being human. The ideal natural person (one who does not know what death is) and Emile (who is totally self-sufficient) overstate the degree of equilibrium we can hope to attain. Having compassion for others involves a certain amount of attachment to others, and for this reason we can never completely avoid “feeling death twice.” We can, however, begin to understand that happiness does not depend on longevity but humanity.

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NOTES

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire* (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1997), 136. I refer to the book hereafter as *Rêveries*. All translations of Rousseau are my own.

2. *Ibid.*, 59.

3. *Ibid.*, 139.

4. Among the few observers of Rousseau who have discussed this issue, see Allan Bloom, Introduction to Rousseau’s *Emile* (Basic Books, 1979), 9–10; Patrick Deneen, *The Odyssey of Political Theory* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 134–39; Arthur Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau’s Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Richard Velkely, “Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal” in *Being After Rousseau; Philosophy and Culture in Question* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). I am not aware, however, of any studies of Rousseau that have made the fear of death a central thematic issue.

5. Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck, 99 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

6. *Ibid.*, 89.

7. As Quentin Skinner points out, Hobbes’s work is more rhetorical than scientific. This is the major premise of his *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

8. Francis Bacon, whose *Essays* Hobbes helped translate into Latin, claims that “there is no passion in the mind of man so weak, but it mates and masters the fear of death.” Among these passions Bacon names revenge, love, and honor. Bacon, “Of Death” in *Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral*, ed. Brian Vickers, 6 (London: Folio Society, 2002).

9. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 11.

10. Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, chap. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Emphasis is mine.

11. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 10. Although duels do not take place today, there are those who kill for signs of disrespect, and these people are, as Hobbes would hope, regarded with ignominy.

12. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Thomas Hobbes, ed. David Grene, xxii, chap. 2., chap. 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). That Hobbes regarded history as an appropriate source of evidence for civil and moral science is clear from his much later work, *Man and Citizen*, where he says that “[histories] are useful, too . . . for these supply in abundance the evidence on which rests the science of causes; in truth, natural history for physics and also civil histories for civil and moral science.” Hobbes, *Man and Citizen*, ed. Bernard Gert, trans. Charles T. Wood et al., 50 (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998).

13. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 8.

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, chap. 13. Some resort to violence for “trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue.”

16. *Ibid.*, chap. 8.

17. This is the implication of *Leviathan*, chap. 35, where Hobbes argues that the Kingdom of God spoken of in the Bible is a kingdom that will arise in the future here on Earth.

18. This raises the perennial question: Why risk one’s life in war? At the end of *Leviathan*, almost as an afterthought, Hobbes asserts that one of the laws of nature he did not mention in chap. 15 is we have a duty to protect the sovereign in war. The only support he gives this claim is that it would be unjust for us to destroy the power that protects us—but this is not the same as saying we have a duty to die for him. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 484.

19. Michael Gillespie, “Where Did All the Evils Go?” in *Naming Evil, Judging Evil*, ed. Ruth Grant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

20. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 66–67.

21. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 11.

22. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, ed. Richard Cox, sect. 123 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982).

23. *Ibid.*, chap. 9.

24. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 10.

25. As Laurence Cooper writes, “Amour propre is the source of all feeling and behavior that concern the individual’s need to establish, maintain, or confirm his or her sense of self-worth—in today’s popular language, self-esteem.” Cooper, *Rousseau, Nature and the Problem of the Good Life* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 149.

26. Michael Oakeshott, “The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes,” in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1991), 302. Peter Augustine Lawler notes connections among technological advancement, vanity, and the avoidance of death: “Our unprecedented medical knowledge—characterized by one breakthrough after another when it comes to diet, exercise, supplements, and so forth—means that we have an increasingly long list of things to do in order to fend off death as long as possible. Because we know so much, we must work harder than ever against death. In fact, sickness and death seem today to be shameful evidence of personal irresponsibility.” Lawler, *Stuck with Virtue* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2005), xxii.

27. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, who studies the contemporary approach to death, notes a connection between technological advancement and the increasing denial of the reality of death: “We would think that our great emancipation, our knowledge of science and of man, has given us better ways and means to prepare ourselves and our families for the inevitable happening. Instead the days are gone when a man was allowed to die in peace and dignity in his own home. The more we are making advancements in science, the more we seem to fear and deny the reality of death.” Kübler-Ross, *On Death and Dying* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 21.

28. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile ou de l’éducation* (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1966), 251.

29. *Ibid.*, 96. Emphasis added.

30. *Ibid.*

31. One of the premises of Kübler-Ross’s work is that “in our unconscious, death is never possible with regard to ourselves. It is inconceivable for our unconscious to imagine an actual ending of our own life here on earth, and if this life of ours has to end, the ending is always attributed to a malicious intervention from the outside by someone else” (*On Death and Dying*, 16). I argue that today even such common causes of death as heart disease and cancer are seen as malicious interventions (because on some level we believe them to be preventable and potentially treatable), and even, in Hobbes’s terms, as a type of violent death. It should also be noted that Hobbes does not consistently assert that only violent death is the greatest evil for mankind; for example, in *On the Citizen* he claims that all people seek what is good and avoid what is bad, “most of all the greatest of natural evils, which is death.” (chap. 1).

32. Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1992), 179. Hereafter *Second Discourse*.
33. Rousseau, *Emile*, 97.
34. *Ibid.*, 267, 271.
35. Arthur Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 46–47.
36. Rousseau, "Avertissement," in *Second Discourse*, 166. See also Richard Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *Being After Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
37. Velkley, "Speech, Imagination," 48.
38. Rousseau, *Emile*, 377–78.
39. *Ibid.*, 295.
40. *Ibid.*, 96.
41. *Ibid.*, 104.
42. *Ibid.*, 619.
43. *Ibid.*, 165.
44. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 177. Rousseau here claims that man is afraid of the unknown, but that this only happens in "rare circumstances in the state of nature, where all things function in such a uniform manner." He also feels himself to be strong after comparing himself to other animals and finding himself superior.
45. Rousseau, *Emile*, 334. This, incidentally, complicates Rousseau's earlier claim that the source of human weakness was when desire outstrips ability.
46. *Ibid.*, 71.
47. *Ibid.*, 60. It is questionable whether Rousseau would take Emile to a modern hospital where even the most serious conditions can be treated for lengthy periods but not always cured. It seems likely that if Emile had cancer Rousseau would not allow him to be subjected to many months of painful treatment if there were a fifty percent chance of survival.
48. *Ibid.*, 58.
49. *Ibid.*, 96.
50. *Ibid.*, 366.
51. *Ibid.*, 96. There is a striking similarity between Rousseau's attitude and what Socrates says in Plato's *Republic* about the carpenter who decides he cannot afford to live for an extended period under a doctor's care, and either gets better or dies and is rid of his troubles. The carpenter cannot participate in society through his work unless he stops paying attention to his illness and "minds his own business" by paying attention to "the work at hand." Unfortunately there is no space here to explore this issue more fully.
52. *Ibid.*, 58.
53. *Ibid.*, 65.
54. *Ibid.*, 59.
55. See Laurence Cooper's excellent discussion on this point in *Rousseau, Nature and the Problem of the Good Life* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 19–29.
56. Rousseau, *Emile*, 43.
57. Rousseau, *Rêveries*, 115.
58. Rousseau, *Emile*, 215.
59. Rousseau, *Rêveries*, 68.
60. *Ibid.*, 116.
61. *Ibid.*
62. The issue of happiness and temporality, however, is not straightforward. Although Rousseau claims "as for happiness that lasts, I doubt that it is known," he also maintains that one who is in the state of happiness he describes does not experience time, and as long as he is in this state, can truly be called perfectly happy (*Rêveries*, 116).
63. *Ibid.*, 67.
64. *Ibid.*, 64.
65. Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man*, 42.
66. Rousseau, *Emile*, 287.
67. *Ibid.*, 284.
68. Epictetus, *The Handbook*, trans. Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 12.
69. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 226.
70. Rousseau, *Emile*, 451. This statement is followed by a discussion of the joys of friendship—joys that Emile is never meant to know.
71. *Ibid.*, 582. As Joseph R. Reiser notes, Rousseau "judged the most profoundly corrupting relationships to be those of personal dependence." Reiser, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Friend of Virtue* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 69.
72. Reiser, *A Friend of Virtue*, 84. This unusual friendship turns out to be quite unequal—the tutor's happiness is entirely dependent on Emile's, whereas Emile's does not depend on that of the tutor.
73. Deneen, *The Odyssey of Political Theory*, 146.
74. Rousseau, *Emile et Sophie, or les Solitaires*, in *Oeuvres Complete IV* (Dijon: Bibliothèque de la Pléade, 1969), 881.
75. *Ibid.*, 883.
76. *Ibid.*, 884.
77. *Ibid.*, 904.
78. This solitary journey leads him to a state of slavery at the hands of Barbary pirates in which he experiences a stoicism reminiscent of Epictetus.
79. Rousseau, *Du Contrat social* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), book 2, chap. 5.
80. Rousseau, *Emile*, 40. [AQ14: See AQ9]
81. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 214.
82. Rousseau, *Emile*, 289. [AQ15: See AQ9]
83. Rousseau, *Rêveries*, 139.
84. Cooper, *Rousseau*, 105.
85. Rousseau, *Rêveries*, 55.
86. *Ibid.*, 117.
87. Rousseau, *Emile*, 344. [AQ16: See AQ9]
88. Rousseau, *Rêveries*, 122. Rousseau is not particularly careful with his superlatives; we have already seen him describe the feeling on waking from his fall in Paris as the sweetest he ever felt.
89. *Ibid.*
90. Rousseau, *Emile*, 60. [AQ17: See AQ9]
91. *Ibid.*, 290.
92. *Ibid.*, 295.
93. *Ibid.*, 293.
94. *Ibid.*, 298.
95. *Ibid.*, 297.
96. *Ibid.*, 408–09.